





Lukashenka’s rating:  
 
According to the most recent polls, around 80% of voters are going to take part at Presidential 
elections (in 2001 and in 2004 the number was more than 80%) – this is 5.600.000 people. In 
September 2005 the popularity of Alexander Lukashenka is 47%. Taking into account the 
number of officially registered voters in Belarus1 this would be 3.315.000 people ready to 
vote for him today. Lukashenka has been launched and maintained a permanent campaign 
from the 2004 referendum causing his high personal rating. It is important to note that 
according to independent exit poll he reached 48% during the 2004 referendum (opposing the 
officially released 84% result). The coincidence between his current ratings and the exit poll 
results on the referendum suggests that his maximum rating may not reach the current 47%.2  
 
As the polling shows, if there is no alternative, Lukashenka could win without additional 
efforts to increase his popularity or election fraud. Therefore major resources of Belarusian 
supporters of changes must be directed at presenting the alternative to the Belarusian 
electorate, and creating the atmosphere of change.  
 
Single Candidate ratings:  
 
Although Lukashenka’s ratings are high, it must be understood in terms of the current “no 
alternative” atmosphere of Belarus. Even in the current situation, as much as 38% of citizens 
believed in May 2005 that there are leaders in Belarus who could govern the country better 
than Lukashenka, while in September this figure was 45%, which demonstrate the influence 
of the process of selecting the single candidate.3 Current polls (September 20054) show that 
                                                 
1
 According to data provided by Central Electoral Commission on October 17, 2005 this is 7.000.000 
2
 Number of people ready to vote for Lukashenka today is 59,2% out of total number of those who is going to 
vote (p.2). 28,4% respondents (open questioning) and 14,2% respondents (closed questioning) found it difficult 
to answer – this is 2.000.000 to 1.000.000 people (1.500.000 people on average). Analysis shows that up to one 
third of those not answering to popularity questions would finally vote for the version proposed by the 
administration. So if we add one third of undecided (500.000) to the number of those ready to vote for 
Lukashenka today, the number of expected votes in his support would raise up to 3.815.000, which would be 
68,1% out of expected number of those who would vote.  
 
3
 The current four major efforts at democratic structure may change the current atmosphere in the country: 1) 
Single candidate campaign (political parties) to present the alternative, and build up his platform, constituency 
and trust among people, 2) Civic campaign (civil society) create the atmosphere of change, advocating issues 
where the majority are against the regime (such as injustice, freedom, and other values) and making the large 
majority of population to accept changes, 3) Mobilization campaign (street protest) to increase number of those 
willing to take the streets on post-election days. 4) Demobilization campaign targeting law enforcement agencies 
and authorities to weaken the ruler’s control of his own government  
4
 Conducted before the Congress of  Democratic Forces which took place on October 1-2, 2005 
Milinkevic as party candidate could reach around 15% of the votes, as candidate of 
democratic opposition he could reach 27%, while as candidate of those currently seeking for 
an alternative 45%. We have to emphasize that the campaigns of the democratic structures - 
except the so-called solidarity campaign5 - have not started, yet.  
 
Milinkevic`s personal rating was less than 3% in May in the direct ballot question 
(comparing to Lukashenka’s 39%). In the September poll he had 11%, while in the end of 
October - based on tracking poll6 - he reached 21%. This suggests that he has possibility to 
reach the projected 45% (those currently seeking alternative toward Lukashenka`) in case of 
consolidation of political parties will continue and will able to have new, alternative form of 
information channels to inform citizens.  
 
One of the key issue is the continuous consolidation of the democratic coalition, where the 
key is the relations between the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF, Chairman Vincuk 
Viachorka), and the United Civic Party (UCP, Chairman Anatolij Lebedko, Vice-Chairwomen 
Lyudmila Gryaznova)7. Alexander Milinkevic (although he is non-partisan) was the candidate 
of the BPF, and he won by eight votes to Lebedko in the Congress. Lebedko was very 
disappointed after the Congress, but he agreed to head the shadow government. On the 
contrary, according to a few observers, the BPF – having Milinkevic as the face of the 
opposition - could focus on strengthening its position within the opposition and society. Such 
development (on both sides) could lead to lack of focus on the tasks of the upcoming 
presidential elections.   
 
Additionally, the regime has a chance to decrease the opposition chances through 
discreditation campaign against Milinkevic (which have not started, yet) and increasing the 
number of democratic candidates to divide the votes for the alternative. One of the main 
questions is whether Alexander Kazulin, the former rector of the Belarusian State University, 
and the head of the Social Democratic Party “Gromada” (the only party not joining the 
democratic coalition) will run in the elections.   
 
 
Possible (Post)Elections Scenarios:  
 
There are for possible scenarios for the elections and post-elections development of Belarus:  
 
• Optimistic: Milinkevic will win the elections and the opposition will force the authorities 
to accept the change.   
 
• Realistic:  reaching 30 – 35 % of votes for the single democratic candidate in the 
upcoming elections would signal the return of the opposition to the mainstream is a real 
political power, whose opinion would be taken seriously not only by foreign partners, but 
by the regime, too. Such a result would send strong messages for Belarusians about the 
                                                 
5
 The solidarity campaign focusing on the disappeared people, which although an important topic for democratic 
forces, appears intangible for most of the Belarusians 
6
 Representative poll is conducted on 1504 respondents. Pontis`s sociological partners in Belarus - IISEPS and 
NOVAK - running representative poll monthly. Tracking poll is conducted every 2nd day on 200 respondents 
allowing to follow the dynamics of ratings.  
7
 These two parties are the main engines of the democratic parties in Belarus, BPF is leading the so-called 
national-democratic side having nationalistic (and pro-Russian) tendencies, while UCP is on the top of the 
liberal-conservative line, advocating free market economy and good relations with Russia. Both parties are 
strongly for independent Belarus, and do not support the unification with Russia by any means.  
real alternative to the present regime, and could enhance restructuring within the current 
system.  
 
• Pessimistic:  Milinkevic will fail to receive more than 20% of the votes. This will mean 
backsliding to conformism8, similarly to the normalization period of Czechoslovakia 
(although definitely not that long).  
 
• Fatalistic:  Belarus as independent country will disappear through integration with Russia  
 
While the realistic than pessimistic scenarios are most likely to happen, based on the current 
forecast Pontis suggest an important addition to the “optimistic” scenario. If the democratic 
forces campaign efforts will be well-done and successful, Milinkevic could equal the rating of 
Lukashenka’s. In this case there are high potential of eruption of conflicts, e.g. even 
bloodshed is possible given the hard-core attitude of the regime toward any mass protest.  To 
decrease possibility of such scenario, the democratic forces must be successful achieving the 
atmosphere of change, and push the majority (including Lukashenka supporters) to accept the 
change.  
 
The most important role of international community is raising the costs of the status quo 
and lowering the costs of transition. Currently in the EU, majority of the member states are 
for the status quo, given their bilateral relations with Russia, but also the domestic support of 
Lukashenka in Belarus. Nevertheless, even those countries doing “business as usual” with the 
current regime, should aid democratic structures, especially supporting new communication 
and information channels. Given the assessment that Lukashenka will make sure he wins the 
majority of the EU members states are prepared for long-term process of transformation. One 
of the efforts of the EU is to decrease the imposed self-isolation of the regime by trying to 
strengthen official, middle level contacts and strengthen business relations. Such effort, 
however, could lead to support9, and to legitimate Lukashenka’s third term.  Since currently 
there is a reasonable chance that the character of the regime would remain even after 
Lukashenka leaves, the neo-Soviet, conformist Belarus, and the removal of its main personal 
representative, should be the main goal of the EU policy before and after the 2006 presidential 
elections.  The question is what tools are best suited for this.  
 
                                                 
8
 See more about this in the fresh survey of the Pontis Foundation  “Potential for Change or Backsliding to 
Conformism: Future Trends of Belarus Politics at http://www.pontisfoundation.sk/11013 
9
 The EU is already the biggest trading partner of Belarus. See more about this topic at the policy paper 
“Dependence of Belarus economy on trading with Western European  countries and USA, September 2005 
